

METL Task Selection and the Current Operational Environment

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

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The operational environment since 1989 has changed significantly since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union catapulted the US into the role of sole remaining super power. The US role as super power required the US Army to deploy to Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Hungary, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo since 1990. The current operational environment precipitated changes in the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) that ultimately changed force structure in the army. Specific threats that the US must respond to are; regional threats, transnational threats, and threats from the spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence collection and failed states. These threats require responses from the US political leadership and the army.

This monograph analyzes literature to define the changes in the current operational environment. Next, this study reviews US Army training doctrine to determine whether the current army doctrine is adequate. Criteria selected for this monograph are: Common METL tasks, relevance and responsiveness. Changes to METL task selection, such as adding Stability and Support Operations (SASO) tasks, are required. These changes become evident once the criteria are applied to the doctrine and the changes in the current operational environment.

US Army capstone training manual, FM 25-100 1988, is outdated. Chapters in this manual, specifically the METL and Battle Focus, continue to serve the army's training very well. FM 25-100, however, was written for the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and is still the fundamental training manual for MTW only. Relevance defined as time of arrival to conflict with a trained force that can be withdrawn to an MTW is difficult to achieve with current doctrine. The current US Army Division system deploys on short notice to an MTW, but deploys slowly to a SASO. This mission deployment paradigm is shifting based on the guidance from the new Chief. The US Army must adjust training doctrine, specifically METL task selection, in order to be dominant against full spectrum operations. This dominance cannot be achieved without changing the MTW only focus on the US Army METLs to Common METLs that will verify both relevance and responsiveness.

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INTRODUCTION

The operational environment has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War in 1989. In response to the changing operational environment the US Army's participation in peace operations has increased exponentially. The US Army's capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5 Operations, last revised in 1993, incorporates peace operations. The US Army training doctrine, FM 25-100 Training the Force (1988), and FM 25-101 Battle Focused Training (1990), unlike FM 100-5, have not been revised since their initial publications. These training manuals were written to defeat the Soviet Union not to enforce peace in Bosnia or Kosovo. Subsequently, many units' Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) currently reflect tasks that prepare them to fight and win in a Cold War or a Major Theater War (MTW) environment while ignoring preparations for Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Is the US Army current training doctrine adequate to prepare units to meet the challenges of both MTW and SASO? Should heavy CONUS based units METLs reflect MTW tasks, SASO tasks or a combination of MTW and SASO? Is it still valid to train for the high-end decisive operations first and when required transition to training for SASOs? This paper analyzes both the current US Army training doctrine and the METL tasks selected by a heavy armored CONUS division. The selected division, the 1st Cavalry Division, is one of the two premiere heavy CONUS divisions. Both the premiere CONUS based heavy divisions until recently did not conduct division level SASOs. However, recently 1st Cavalry executed the Bosnia mission, and the 3d Infantry Division at

Ft. Stewart, Georgia was alerted to perform the Bosnia Mission in 2001. 1st Cavalry Division's priority, based on the selected tasks, is to train for the MTW first and then transition to peace operations. The 1st Cavalry division has significant roles in both MTW plans. Moreover, this division, similar to other divisions, must take its turn at conducting SASOs.

Chapter I describe the current operational environment, which poses new challenges for the US political leadership and the Army. This chapter compares the operational environment during the Cold War to the present operational environment and also analyzes the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Next chapter I reviews political policies that dictate the Army's commitment to preparations for MTW and peace operations. Finally, this section analyzes the US Army in terms of force structure and some of the major challenges it faces as the 21st Century draws near.

Chapter II reviews and analyzes the current US Army training doctrine, specifically FM 25-100, FM 25-101, FM 100-23 Peace Operations (1994), to determine how the US Army trains for both MTWs and SASO. Additionally, the chapter distinguishes warfighting and SASO focused tasks. The doctrinal review chapter also identifies "**Common METL Tasks**". Common METL tasks, a criteria for this paper, are defined as those tasks that are common in both MTW METLs and SASO METLs. Common METL tasks may offer some solutions to potential training issues. For example, Common METL Tasks may solve the potential issue of how to train for SASOs prior to alert notification which allows units then to focus on deployment and sustainment rather than training. This criteria,

Common METL Tasks, may best prepare heavy CONUS units by increasing the responsiveness of the heavy CONUS unit to SASO contingencies that occur without warning such as an East Timor. Finally, Chapter II analyzes the impact of inadequate training doctrine on units.

Once the background of the operational environment is established, the monograph conducts a review of training doctrine, then the study identifies which METL is most relevant. Chapter III, the **relevance** chapter, commences with an analysis of both MTW METLs and SASO METLs. Relevance, the second criteria for this paper, defines those METL tasks that best prepare units for success in the current operational environment. For example, should the US Army continue to train for the MTW and transition to SASO or should the US Army train Common METLs? Additionally, this chapter analyzes the 1st Cavalry Division's METL prior to, during and after the recent Bosnia peace operation mission. This analysis identifies whether it is best for a heavy CONUS divisions' METLs to remain MTW focused, SASO focused, or a combination of common tasks.

Chapter IV determines unit **responsiveness** by analyzing which METL tasks best prepares units for the most likely threat in the current operational environment. Responsiveness is the third criteria in this monograph. The responsiveness criteria analyzes which METL in addition to the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) facilitates the quickest deployment of trained forces. The responsiveness chapter will answer the question of which METL is best suited to respond quickly and adequately to the current operational environment; a common METL, a Warfighting METL or a SASO METL? The monograph next

analyzes the current Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) requirement for validity. The MRE requirement, a mandated training and validation exercise, is designed for the units deploying to the SASOs.

The significance of this paper is the changes identified in the current operational environment, then an analysis of US Army training doctrine to determine if it is adequate to meet the needs of the current operational environment. This paper then analyzes MTW METLs and SASO METLs to determine which is best. Lastly, this monograph analyzes the current METL tasks selected by a CONUS heavy division to determine whether it is adequate to respond to the current operational environment when measured against criteria of relevance and responsiveness.

The Operational Environment

As an institution, the Army was beginning to appreciate that its missions were changing. We were being asked to do things that were largely unfamiliar to the generation of soldiers accustomed to facing the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper in Hope is Not a Method-1997¹

The current operational environment is significantly different than the Cold War dominated operational environment. The Cold War operational environment began with the conclusion of the World War II and ended with the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989. During the Cold War, weak nation states survived thanks to patronage and the international climate that favored stability and sovereignty.

Many of these states collapsed in the 1990s after the Cold War ended and external support was withdrawn. For example, the former Yugoslavia is a nation state that collapsed in part because it lost the economic, political and structural support provided by the former Soviet Union. Somalia, on the other hand, is an example of a failed nation state that was supported economically and structurally by the United States during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War caused several nations to collapse because their structure, authority, legitimate power, law and political order fell apart once the Soviet Union and US withdrew support.

The Cold War with the Soviet Union ended in 1989 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and finally with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. One of the consequences of the fall of communism in the Soviet Union is the now rare use of the Russia's veto vote in United Nations Security Council Actions. Russia is now more cooperative with the other democratic nations that make up the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, Russia is more concerned with internal affairs such as a weak economy, organized crime, and the break away of former provinces, rather than the spread of communism. As a result of the USSR dissolution, the United States became the sole remaining superpower. The sole remaining super power incurs numerous world responsibilities. Therefore, the United States Army, primarily because of changes in Russia since 1990, has participated in peace operations in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Hungary, Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo.ⁱⁱ

Changes in the operational environment, the fall of the Soviet Union, internal struggles in the former Soviet Union, the collapse of the WARSAW Pact,

and the failure of numerous nation states precipitated changes in the United States National Security Strategy (NSS). The National Security Strategy for a New Century, approved by President Clinton in October 1998, defines five threats to US interests. A brief analysis of the five threats; regional threats, transnational threats, a threat from the spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence collection and failed states is necessary. Regional threats are states that have the capabilities to threaten our vital interests, through coercion or cross border aggression. Regional threats, such as Iraq and North Korea, actively improve their offensive capabilities, including their efforts to obtain nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the long-range delivery systems to support these systems. Additionally, regional threats such as Iran threaten not only their neighbors but also the free oil that flows from the region.³

Transnational threats, unlike regional threats, gain their support covertly from states and nations. Transnational threats supported by rogue nations such as Afghanistan and Iran among others, threatens American interests and citizens both directly and indirectly. Transnational enemies typically sponsor and promote terrorism, harbor illegal drug trade, support illicit arms trafficking, and provides safe havens for international organized crime. Additionally, transnational threats cause uncontrolled refugee migrations, increase environmental damage, obstruct economic growth, hinder democratic development and lead to conflict. Transnational threats further complicate situations because they blur the distinction between terrorist groups, factions in ethnic conflicts, and insurgent movements. Transnational threats, according to

the NSS, typically require early involvement by US forces because the problem becomes significantly more dangerous and complicated over time.ⁱⁱⁱ

Acquisition of dangerous technologies, such as weapons of mass destruction, by rogue nations poses the greatest threat to the global security. Examples of WMD are chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver these munitions. Advanced weapon technologies threatens to provide the means to inflict tremendous harm to US citizens and troops both abroad and at home. The acquisition of dangerous technologies by enemy forces threatens vital US national interests. The US must identify and quarantine the technical information, technologies and materials in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of rogue nations and enemies.⁴

Foreign intelligence collection, as a threat identified by the NSS, is more diverse, complex and difficult to counter. Espionage did not go away with the end of the Cold War. In some ways the US became more vulnerable to foreign espionage due to the increased access of foreigners to US industry and governmental agencies. This threat mixes both traditional and non-traditional intelligence adversaries. These adversaries target the US military, diplomatic, technological and commercial secrets. A recent example is the Chinese penetration of US nuclear weapons technology. The Chinese government mixes both the traditional adversary and the non-traditional adversary. US Army Divisions must adjust from a Cold War training philosophy of decisive action to a Post Cold War training regimen, which includes force protection and anti-

terrorism. The Post Cold War training regimen prepares the army for both traditional and non-traditional threats, which are characteristics of the operational environment.^{iv}

Lastly, failed states are expected to increase in importance as threats to US citizens' abroad. Despite the best international efforts, significant problems arise when governments fail. "State collapse occurs when structure, authority, legitimate power, law, and political order fall apart, leaving behind a civil society that lacks the ability to rebound to fill the vacuum", according to Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, members of the Brookings Institution in 1995.^v Failed states produce refugees, civil wars, humanitarian crisis and political extremism. For example, the failed states' population migrates across borders which increases the risk of heightening ethnic tensions and increases the chances of harm inflicted upon this displaced population.^{vi}

The current operational environment is expected to continue challenging the US Army. Future threats include failed nation states that are established with no consideration of tribal or ethnic boundaries. In fact the nation state maybe an irrelevant framework. Failed states, such as Somalia, are a new phenomenon to the international system. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner defined the failed nation state as "utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community".⁷ Somalia is a good example of a recent failed nation that lacks infrastructure, exists in chronic poverty, is divided along ethnic fault lines, suffers from environmental destruction, and suffers from both overpopulation and the lack of a viable government. Similarly, William Olson

listed Haiti; Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, the Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Zaire, and the former Soviet Union as failed nation states.⁸ Most importantly, these problems spread to nearby nations, causing the problem to become a significant concern for the international community. The solutions to these international community concerns about failed states, according to Brian Atwood, an administrator with the US Agency for International Development is increasingly difficult to define. Brian Atwood further explains that the troubling and unique crises in Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda indeed share a common thread.⁹ Moreover, failed nation states have the potential to generate a tremendous refugee problem.

The operational environment has changed significantly since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Cold War, to some degree, had a stabilizing impact on the operational environment. Changes in the operational environment caused the NSS to change in order to adequately respond. The US government, specifically the US Army, must now deter regional threats, transnational threats, threats from the spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence collection, and failed nations while simultaneously preparing to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Theater War (MTW) in two distant theaters. This monograph will next explore changes that resulted from threats identified in the NSS and the impact on the National Military Strategy (NMS), in addition to changes in the political policies which impacts both the committal of the army and what types of missions the army is committed to. The commitment of the army to these new missions was significant in designing the army's new structure.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) August 1997 analyzed the guidance from the NSS and then provided advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NMS concluded “that the primary purpose of the US Armed Forces is to deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats should deterrence fail.” Therefore, the US Armed Forces are organized, trained, equipped, maintained, and deployed to ensure that the US can defeat aggression against our nation and protect our national interest.¹⁰

The NMS categorizes three US national interests; vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian interests. Vital interests are first in priority to protect because of their overriding importance to the survival security and territorial integrity of the United States. The armed forces are prepared to use decisive and overwhelming force, unilaterally if necessary, to defend the vital interests. Second in priority to defend, according to the NMS, is the US important interests. Important interests may not affect our national survival but do affect our national well being. The third priority of protected interests is humanitarian interests. Humanitarian interests are defined as those that compel our nation to act because our values demand involvement.¹¹¹¹

The operational environment was more stable during the Cold War. For example, the United Nations (UN) since the end of World War II sanctioned thirty military operations. These thirty operations, however, do not include operations carried out under separate agreements, such as the Multinational Force Observer (MFO) in the Sinai.¹² A UN study concluded that the UN approved a

total of forty-one peace-keeping operations.¹³ In the forty years from 1948 and 1988, fifteen of these peace operations occurred. The remaining twenty-six peace operations have occurred in the ten years since 1989.¹⁴ The frequency of the US Army participation in peace operations is expected to continue to increase.¹⁵ The current operational environment is not stable and presents numerous challenges to the United States and the US Army.

Most conflicts that required committal of US troops, by the end of the Cold War, were intrastate rather than interstate.¹⁶ The impacts of intrastate conflicts cause ambiguity in the decision process to commit US troops. The major concerns are public support for troop commitment and an apparent zero tolerance of US casualties. Changes in the operational environment over time forced United States presidents to exercise extreme caution when deciding to commit US armed forces. Kevin Campbell, an assistant professor of political science and international relations at the University of Delaware, writes that the US military in addition to the past presidents is reluctant to use force in the current operational environment.¹⁷

The significant changes resulting from the current operational environment continues to impact political policies and later US Army Division's training. President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (May 1994), which clarified the differences between "command of and operational control" of U.S. soldiers for limited operations. Moreover, PDD 25 set a framework for continued increased participation of US forces in peace operations. Consequently, President Clinton signed PDD 56 (May 1997) which

requires more cooperation throughout governmental agencies, the military, and specific civilian organizations in an attempt to improve management of complex peace operations.¹⁸

PDD 56 is designed specifically to aid in the frequent intrastate conflicts, such as the Balkans, when political complexity is extreme, and the solution requires the integration of many organizations to solve. Usually, a large number of national, international, civilian, military organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are engaged in a broad political, economic, informational, and military effort to bring about peace. The current operational environment requires a political and military perspective that is, in essence, multinational, multiorganizational, and multidimensional.¹⁹

The operational environment impacts the US Army structure most significantly. The decision to reduce the army structure was partly because of the current operational environment. Consequently, the army reduced from eighteen divisions to ten divisions since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Additionally, the army is no longer primarily forward deployed in Europe and depends on power projection capabilities to rapidly deploy CONUS-based units worldwide. The budget reductions, manpower reductions, and loss of infrastructure make conducting frequent peace operations and maintaining MTW readiness simultaneously a difficult issue.²⁰

Conducting frequent peace operations and maintaining MTW readiness simultaneously forced the active component to rely more on the integration of both the Reserves and National Guard during the current

operational environment. This reliance requires the Reserves and National Guard units to deploy frequently to operations such as Bosnia and Kosovo, unlike the Cold War. The GAO reports that "throughout 1996 more than 10,000 Guard and Reserve personnel have supported OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR, now OPERATION JOINT GUARD from bases in Bosnia, Croatia, the US, Hungary, Germany, Italy and elsewhere in Europe."²¹ The reserve units specifically, provide specialty skills such as water supply, civil affairs, PSYOP, hospitals and military police battalions.²² Increased pace of operations for both active and reserve units are results of the current operational environment.

Dr. Max G. Manwaring (Colonel, USA, Retired) suggests that the US Army will become more dependent upon the Reserve Forces because of the two MTW mandate and future SASOs. Dr. Manwaring recommends that the army make the following changes in order to create a more responsive and balanced total force:

- Reevaluate and expand the force structure of selected active and reserve units and individuals to meet current planning requirements for major regional contingencies
- Determine the right mix or the right combination of active and reserve component units and individuals with high deployment tempos
- Redefine and reduce the time required to mobilize and demobilize reserve component soldiers to allow maximum time on the mission

-Pursue initiatives such as the “prime the Pump” programs to make available up to 30,000 reserve component volunteers prior to a planned Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC)

-Take the necessary steps to promulgate any new legislation that might be required to make the total army more efficient and effective.²³

The increased pace of operations in the last decade along with the sizable reduction in force structure has impacted the US Army. The pace of operations since 1989 has grown to over 300%. Within the force structure, Active and Reserve forces, by contrast, shrunk by 40%. The changes in force structure forced the Active component to rely on the Reserve component to meet the requirements of the NMS.²⁴ Additionally, terms such as OPTEMPO, a measure of the pace of operations, and PERSTEMPO, a measure of the time an individual spends away from home station were created in the last decade to measure the pace of operations. OPTEMPO, increased during 1990s due to peace operation deployments, increased requirements of humanitarian assistance, increased requirements to support disaster relief, and support to counter-drug operations, as well as more joint and combined exercises.²⁵

ANALYSIS

The current operational environment, since 1989, has changed significantly. The US is the sole superpower in the Post Cold War operational environment. As a result of this role, changes occurred in the NSS, NMS, presidential policies and the US Army. Failed nation states did not threaten the

international community, US vital interest or the US directly prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The US and the US Army must become more diverse in developing policies and strategies to combat these threats of the current operational environment. Unprecedented changes in cooperation between the US governmental agencies, civilian aid agencies, and the military are imperative to solve the complex problems of the current operational environment. Most importantly, the military's doctrine, and training must adapt to the current operational environment in order to remain relevant and responsive to the needs of America and its interest.

Chapter II

Doctrinal Review

When 51% of the commanders in the Army –generals through captains-operate instinctively in accordance with the principles.... at that time it will be genuine doctrine.

-General William E. Depuy, February 18, 1976 ²⁶

Doctrine, according to FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics, provides the US Army's fundamental principles that military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is also authoritative but requires judgment in application.²⁷ The current US Army's doctrine does not adequately address how to train for both two nearly simultaneous MTWs and SASOs. Mission essential task lists (METL), which provide training focus and priorities, include primarily MTW type tasks.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) specifically states that the priority mission of the US Army is to fight and win major theater wars.²⁸ The NSS requirement to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames is most difficult for an army that is frequently conducting SASOs. As a result of the NSS guidance and army doctrine, training for peace operations will remain second priority to the MTW.

The Army is facing a dilemma. On the one hand, it must prepare for its primary, and most demanding, mission; fighting a theater war. On the other hand, it also has to prepare for and participate in peace operations. If it prepares more intensively for what it is actually doing-peace operations- it is liable to degrade its ability to carry out its primary mission.

Rand Arroyo Center, Research Division -1998²⁹

Most importantly, the NSS prescribes that the army may withdraw from a peace operation in order to fight or deter aggression in a MTW.³⁰ This mandate further demonstrates the fact that priority of mission is MTW.

FM 100-5 OPERATIONS, 1993 edition, the US Army capstone manual includes three environments; war, conflict, and peace. FM 100-5 defines conflict as a state between peace and war. Moreover, FM 100-5 fails to define how conflict is distinct from war.³¹

Joint doctrine and FM 100-5, the subordinate doctrine, both address Operations Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW is addressed first in chapter two as one of the three ranges of military operations. FM 100-5 prescribes that the prime focus of the Army is warfighting but that the Army's frequent role in OOTW

is critical. As a result of the criticality and frequent participation of the US Army in OOTW missions FM 100-5 lists the types of peacetime operations. They are disaster relief, nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug operations, arms control, treaty verification, support to domestic civil authorities, and peacekeeping. The utilization of US Army forces in the day to day Operations Other than War (OOTW) minimize the threshold of conflict between nations.³²

Chapter thirteen of the 1993 FM 100-5 stated that OOTW missions are not new operations. The OOTW term changed to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) which is now termed Stability and Support Operations (SASO). The US Army, since its inception, provided stability and support operations to the nation. For example, the US Army protected citizens on the frontiers, built roads, bridges and canals such as the Panama Canal.³³

Doctrinally, stability and support operations (SASO) unlike other military operations warrant a specific set of principles. The principles of SASO, according to FM 100-5, are objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. Two of these six principles, objective and unity of effort, are also listed as principles of war in FM 100-5. The principle of objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Similarly, unity of effort states that one commander is in charge and all effort is dedicated to the mission. Legitimacy sustains legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. The principle of perseverance prepares US Army forces for protracted and sustained operations. Restraint means to apply appropriate military capability prudently,

and security reminds army forces to never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. An analysis of both principles of war and the principles of SASO prove that they are for the most part distinct and probably warrant different types of training.³⁴

Some, however, may disagree with the doctrine that SASO warrants a specific group of principles. For example, Richard Rinaldo a military analyst in the Directorate of Joint and Army Doctrine at US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1997 contends that there is a flawed distinction between the principles of war and the principles of SASO. This flaw between the two principles foster independence when interdependence exists and divergence where there is unity. Richard Rinaldo argues that unity of effort may be regarded as a subset of unity of command and that in SASO the requirement to exercise unity of command within the military is not rescinded. The author, Richard Rinaldo, further contends that restraint in SASO is not any less critical in war. Finally, the author concludes that the principles of war, after his review of the complex relationships in warfighting and SASO, remain complete and enduring as fundamental guidelines for conducting military operations.³⁵

FM 100-23 Peace Operations December 1994, contends that Peace Operations is a new term that covers a wide range of activities. However, peace operations are not new to the Army. Since 1948 US soldiers have served in numerous peace operations to include Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and the Sinai. Specifically, FM 100-23 explains that peace operations comprise three types of activities; support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and

preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Traditionally, peace operations include peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movements, and the establishment of protected zones. "The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is inappropriate in peace operations." ³⁶

The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) produced TRADOC PAM 525-5 in August 1994 to complement both the current operational environment requirements and to update doctrine. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 represented the continuation of change, continuity, and growth that will enable the Army to continue as a relevant, strategic force capable of decisive victory into the twenty-first century. Doctrinally, TRADOC PAM 525-5 prescribed that future doctrine will be based on a fluid, strategic environment, lessons learned from ongoing operations, emergence of new warfighting technologies, and results from experimentation. Additionally, versatility became a key characteristic of future doctrine because of the wider roles and missions in the future.³⁷ TRADOC PAM 525-5 recognized the changes in the operational environment such as the frequency of SASOs and the requirement to fight two nearly simultaneous MTWs.

FM 25-100 1988 remains the US Army's current training doctrine. This manual is outdated when compared to FM 100-5 1993, FM 100-23 1994, TRADOC PAM 525-5 1994, and recent changes to the NSS and NMS. This training doctrine was written during the Cold War period of 1985-1987 and

published in 1988. FM 25-100 methodology was designed to train the army to deter war, fight and control wars that do start, and to terminate wars on terms favorable to US and allied interests.³⁸ Conversely, FM 25-100 was not written to train the force to conduct two nearly simultaneous MTWs also while conducting frequent SASOs.

Specifically, FM 25-100 dictates a set of training principles to guide a prescribed training methodology. The principles of training are: train as combined arms and services team (s); train as you fight; use appropriate doctrine; use performance-oriented training; train to challenge; train to sustain proficiency; train using multiechelon techniques; train to maintain; and make commanders the primary trainers.³⁹ These training principles guided the US Army to win the Cold War and win an MTW in Iraq.

In addition to these principles another significant and long lasting contribution of the manual was the introduction of a Mission Essential Task List (METL). The METL combines the essential tasks selected by the commander from war plans and external directives. War plans are defined as the units wartime operations or contingency plans. Subsequently, external directives are defined as additional sources of training tasks that relate to the units' wartime mission. For example, external directives such as installation transition and deployment plans may impact the division's METL. The role of METL fundamentals is to synchronize the development of the METL process. The METL fundamentals are derived from wartime mission and external directives, and apply to the entire organization. All METLs support the higher headquarters'

METL, availability of required resources does not affect METL development and selection, and that the battlefield operating systems are integrated.⁴⁰

The METL development process is optimum for some units and not for others according to Lieutenant Colonels Jones, O'Neill and Scaparrotti in "Training America's Army For the Next Millennium". The authors contend that there are units with very specific war plans for whom the METL process is more than adequate. Other units, by contrast, are not assigned to specific war plans and other units have to many contingencies. "The adjustment of training doctrine to fit this new environment misaligns practice with doctrine, attacking the credibility of the doctrine as a whole."⁴¹ A proposed solution to this problem is that all units analyze their wartime missions to identify their METL. Units with no war plans develop a Core Proficiency Task List (CPTL). The CPTL is a consolidation of the numerous tasks fundamental to the unit accomplishing any mission it might be assigned. This proposed solution offer no change to the METL development process of units with a wartime or contingency mission. All units, once alerted analyze the mission to determine other tasks they will have to add to their current tasks list. Units then revise their METL to include any required tasks.⁴²

Thus far, this chapter discussed the doctrinal principles of both SASO and warfighting. Additionally, we reviewed the doctrine of FM 100-5, FM 100-23, TRADOC PAM 525-5 and the fundamental training doctrine FM 25-100. FM 25-100, compared to the other doctrine, is outdated based on date of publication. FM 100-23 (1994) and TRADOC PAM 525-5 (1994) both incorporates factors

from the current operational environment, unlike FM 25-100 (1988). FM 25-100 most significant contribution, the METL remains adequate to focus training efforts and resources. The remaining portion of this chapter continues to explore FM 25-100 and doctrinal issues that prevent units for training for both MTW and SASO simultaneously, in response to needs of the operational environment. A solution, primarily a modification to current METL tasks, is later proposed to meet the current army requirements.

FM 25-100 is the US Army's doctrinal training manual. FM 25-101 Battle Focused Training, dated September 1990, supplements the training methodology espoused in FM 25-100. Both FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 define 'Battle Focus' as a concept that derives peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. More importantly, battle focus guides the planning, execution, and assessment of each organization's training program to ensure members train as they will fight. Additionally, Commanders use battle focus, which is most critical throughout the training process, to allocate resources for training. Resources are allocated based on wartime mission requirements. Finally, the battle focus concept provides linkage between the collective mission essential tasks, the leader tasks, and soldier tasks, which supports them.⁴³ FM 25-101, in order to sustain the battle focus, lists key points to develop and sustain the METL proficiency. The key points listed in FM 25-101 complements the METL fundamentals listed in FM 25-100. For example, FM 25-101 states that the METL is an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime missions. Similarly, resource availability does not affect METL development.

Consequently, the METL is not prioritized, but may change or adjust over time based on changes to the wartime mission or external directives. Finally, the METL must support and complement the METL of the next higher headquarters. For example, a company METL supports the battalion METL and likewise the battalion METL supports the brigade METL.⁴⁴

US Army doctrine, to date, fails to address “how to” train for both the MTW and the frequent SASO. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, stated that training and preparations for peace operations should not detract from the unit’s primary mission of training soldiers and units first to fight and win in combat. This manual also stated that successful application of warfighting skills is the requirement for success in peace operations. As a result, units should not add peace operations to their METL. Units should, according to FM 100-23, prepare for a significant number of tasks that are different from their wartime missions to train prior to deployment to a SASO.⁴⁵ Current doctrine prohibits units from training for both MTW and SASO by not allowing units to place SASO tasks on their METL.

Dr. Hugo E. Mayer, a TRADOC analyst, concurs that MTW METL focused combat units are equally ready for SASO or contingency missions. Dr. Hugo E. Mayer, a member of the Fort Leavenworth TRADOC Analysis Center, concluded in a 1995 study that training to standard on a unit’s METL is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW. This study also concluded the following: that leaders require additional training in negotiations, that there are no differences in command and control in OOTW, and that units require well-defined goals,

discipline, and rules of engagement (ROE). Dr. Mayer's study supports the contention that units train SASO tasks only when alerted and should train MTW all the time because it is easier to transition to SASO.⁴⁶

Colonel Steven P. Schook, in Paying the Price for Versatility September 1997 disagreed with the concept of preparing for high-end decisive operations first and then transition to SASOs once alerted. COL Schook contends that the army should display institutional versatility and embrace SASO totally, completely and intelligently. The first step to embracing this versatility is to treat SASOs as we do all other missions by placing it on the METL. Placing SASOs on METLs equates to assigning the missions down to division level. Lastly, COL Schook proposes that SASOs appear as prioritized missions on units METLs, and consistently part of the Combat Training Center (CTC) training rotations.⁴⁷ The US Army Research Institute (ARI) for the Behavioral and Social Sciences disagrees with the assumption that a combat ready unit is equally ready for traditional or contingency missions. Additionally, ARI does not agree with FM 100-23's philosophy of "just enough" and "just in time". ARI argues that a platoon night attack live fire, a capstone combat platoon training event, does not develop squad leaders to deal with a terrorist hiding in a school house, or the negotiation skills required to control a check point. The soldiers, leaders, and collective tasks required to accomplish missions in both MTW and SASO vary greatly for the army to make the assumption that if trained for one equates and easier transition to the other.⁴⁸

The current operational environment requires the US Army to conduct frequent SASOs, however current US Army doctrine fails to offer units guidance on how to train for both MTW and SASO simultaneously. This problem is further exacerbated by FM 100-23 listing tasks to include in unit training prior to peacekeeping missions. The tasks listed below are not related to the unit's warfighting METL. Some of the tasks to train as recommended by FM 100-23 are: establishment of lodgments, establishment of a buffer zone, supervision of a truce or cease fire, negotiating skills, checkpoint operations and ROE. Additionally, FM 100-23 also recommends that units train the following tasks during the pre-deployment to a Peace Enforcement operation: enforce UN sanctions, protecting humanitarian relief efforts, separating warring factions, disarming belligerent parties of heavy offensive weapons, restoring law and order, Non-governmental operations (NGO) and PSYOP.⁴⁹ A comparison of MTW METL tasks such as the seven critical wartime operations for an infantry rifle company, movement to contact, attack, raid, ambush, reconnaissance and security, defend and retrograde, proves that SASO tasks and MTW tasks are tremendously different and do not complement each other.⁵⁰

Training units in the current operational environment is not an "either or" situation. CONUS heavy divisions, such as the 1st Cavalry Division, must prepare for both MTW and SASO based on requirements of the current environment. A solution to the train for MTW or train for SASO problem is to train for both simultaneously. For example, units can leverage concurrent training for both MTW and SASO by establishing 'Common METL tasks'.

Common METL tasks are tasks present in both a warfighting METL or a SASO METL. Tasks such as patrolling, security operations, mines and booby traps, employ indirect fires, are trained and compiled on both METLs.

The FM 100-5 writing team, currently writing FM 100-5 2000, published Training Concept Paper #5 in the summer of 1999. This paper proposed four Courses of Actions (COA) to deal with the current dilemma of how best to train units in the current operational environment. Four COAs were considered. COA 1 represents how we currently train. COA 1 trains for the MTW through warfighting tasks and the use of the Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) to conduct SASO specific training and external evaluation prior to deployment. COA 2 requires commanders to train all tasks. COA 3, a direct opposite of COA 1, recommends that the army trains for the most likely mission, SASO and uses the MRE for high-end decisive operations.⁵¹

COA 4 was recommended. COA 4 proposes that unit's train on core or common tasks. Core tasks are those tasks common to both warfighting and SASO. One advantage of this COA is that units are interchangeable at the company and below level. Another advantage is that COA 4 bests satisfies the mission requirements based on the assumption of no changes to current force structure because all interchangeable units can deploy to various SASO environments. The disadvantage of this COA is that commanders must specify units for certain types of missions. For example, one unit could add forest fire fighting to their METL while another unit adds peace enforcement to its METL for an upcoming training period. This COA requires higher commanders to give

specific guidance to subordinate commanders about what types of missions they can expect deployments to in a given training period. A disadvantage of this COA is that it accepts some risk in unit's warfighting abilities.

ANALYSIS

FM 100-5, along with the other doctrinal manuals, fail to adequately address how to simultaneously train frequent SASOs and the requirements to deter two simultaneous MTWs. FMs 25-100 and 25-101 are outdated and do not adequately guide training for units today. In the absence of guidance and the requirements to fulfill the frequent SASO missions units are working around the issues and attempting to train themselves as they prepare to deploy. One of the most significant impacts of deploying a CONUS heavy division to fulfill the SASO requirement is time. The required time is estimated as one year to properly train a CONUS heavy division such as the 1st Cavalry Division to conduct a SASO. A CONUS heavy division must first undergo a training challenge to change their METL from MTW to SASO in addition to deploying themselves. To date, CONUS heavy units METLs are MTW focused. The time involved to deploy CONUS heavy units fuels the argument that the Army is not responsive or relative to the nation requirements. The lack of doctrinal training guidance on how to prepare for both SASO and MTW prior to an alert notification causes units to restructure training, delays the units responsiveness and ultimately causes concerns over the Army's relevance.

Chapter III

Relevance

As one of the Army's two on-call heavy contingency force divisions, the First Team has an on-order mission to deploy to a designated contingency area of operations by sea, air or land; conducts reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. On order, conducts combat operations and redeploys. On order, performs the mission of an ARFOR Headquarters.

The First Cavalry Division Mission Statement, MG Byrnes—April 1998⁵²

Relevance is defined as training that successfully prepare units for military operations in both MTW and SASO environments, for the purposes of this monograph. The US Army, the winner of the Cold War and an MTW in Desert Storm, is currently struggling to maintain and prove its relevance. During a SAMS briefing in October 1998, a General Officer stated that one of the Army's major problems today is relevance. This speaker stated that CINCs, due to changes in the current operational environment require trained rapid deployable forces and that the army at this time is not producing that force.⁵³ Relevance problems are characterized by the time required to strategically deploy, training on new tasks prior to deploying, and the effects of peace operations on unit readiness. One solution to the strategic deployment problem, recently offered by General Eric Shinseki, is for the army to build "New Medium Divisions" that is lighter and more deployable.⁵⁴

In order to analyze the relevance problem in the army, one must review the current US Army divisional structure. The US Army divisional structure consists of ten divisions, five of these divisions are heavy and difficult to deploy. The five heavy divisions (Armored or Mechanized) are 3d Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division. Conversely, the four Light Infantry Divisions, including airborne and air assault, are 10th Mountain, 25th ID (LT), 101st Air Assault, and 82d Airborne Division. 2d Infantry Division in Korea is composed of both heavy and light units. 2nd Infantry Division's geographical location prevents this division from deployable considerations,

for the purposes of this monograph. The relevance problem is accentuated because some believe that light units are to light to fight in all environments and heavy divisions are to heavy to deploy rapidly.⁵⁵

A comparison between Light Infantry Divisions to Heavy Divisions determines that both are well suited to conduct MTW or SASO. FM 71-100, DIVISION OPERATIONS, does not specify in chapter eight which type of division is best suited for SASO. Both types of divisions bring capabilities and limitations. For example, the Light Infantry Division is both rapidly and strategically deployable. This division can conduct a wide range of missions in both MTW and SASO. The habitual use of a Light Division is under a Corps control. The Light Division then exploits advantages of restricted terrain and limited visibility. More importantly, mass is achieved through the combined effects of synchronized operations and fires rather than concentration of forces on the battlefield. Two of the most significant limitations of Light Forces are limited Nuclear Biological and Chemical decontamination capability, and limited Combat Support and Combat Service Support.⁵⁶

Heavy divisions advantages, compared to Light Divisions, are mobility, protection and firepower. Heavy divisions are capable of destroying the enemies armored forces, seizing and securing land areas and securing key terrain. The limitations of heavy divisions are that they are slow to deploy because of their size which consumes significant amounts of strategic lift requirements, limited use in restricted terrain, deploys with few dismounted infantrymen, and utilizes high consumption rates of supplies. Finally, FM 71-100 states that all divisions have capabilities that apply to war, conflict and peace.⁵⁷

Recent deployments by US Army divisions show that both types of divisions, heavy or light, are equally required to prepare first for the MTW and once alerted then SASO. For example, both the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Heavy) were recently tasked to conduct SASOs in Bosnia. The 1st Cavalry METL at the time of alert was:

- Mobilize and Deploy the Force.
- Conduct Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Operations, Protect the Force.
- Conduct Combat Operations.
- Movement to Contact-Deliberate Attack
- Defense, Sustain the Force
- Redeploy and Demobilize
- Perform the Missions of an ARFOR HQ.⁵⁸

This MTW METL contributes to the relevant problem. For example, the 1st Cavalry Division MTW METL required this division to undergo a significant training period prior to deployment to Bosnia. Bosnia, unlike East Timor or Kosovo and future SASOs, allowed the US Army time to schedule unit preparations and rotations.

General Byrnes, the 1st Cavalry Division Commander made a decision not to change the division's METL.⁵⁹ However, General Byrnes directed the development of a training strategy that in essence changed the divisions METL. His training guidance was to replicate current and potential conditions in Bosnia, with a training focus on force protection, individual, platoon and company competencies for Peace Support Operations (PSO), Individual Readiness Training (IRT) and Collective Training, plan and prepare for an MRE, build leader confidence, and train safely.⁵⁹

The 1st Cavalry division decided to sequentially deploy two of the three ground maneuver brigades. 1st Brigade deployed first, followed six months later by 2d Brigade, while 3rd Brigade was tasked to conduct the planning, coordinating, and training effort for the two deploying Brigades. Additionally, the Division Headquarters conducted split-based operations. Split-based operations are characterized by splitting the Division Staff in half. Half of the staff deploys and the other half remains at the present duty station. "Conduct of PSO is a dramatic shift in the 1st Cavalry Divisions' METL. While there is much commonality in tasks- principally the discipline required to conduct any operation- we all had to learn and master new and different tasks," according to Colonel Benjamin Freakley the 3d Brigade Commander April, 1998.⁶⁰

COL Freakley and the 3d Brigade Observer Controller (OC) team along with leaders throughout the division determined the platoon and company Collective Training Competencies, which became the new SASO METL. The platoon tasks selected were: protect the force, conduct a presence patrol, coordinate with civilian/NGOs, conduct a weapon storage site inspection, react to a civil disturbance, control civilian movement, establish a quick reaction force, conduct a tactical road march, operate an observation post, detain noncombatants, operate with multinational forces, establish a traffic control point, participate with the media, react to unexploded ordinance, conduct a weapons confiscation, conduct a vehicle search, react to a person indicted for war crimes, voluntary surrender, and debrief the Intelligence

Officer (S2). A comparison between the standard MTW METL and SASO METL concludes that Conduct a Tactical Roadmarch is the only task that is listed on both the MTW and SASO METLs.⁶¹

Similarly, the company level collective training competencies determined by the controllers and observers were: protect the force, conduct a presence patrol, conduct a meeting with local officials, coordinate with NGOs, conduct a weapon storage site inspection, react to a civil disturbance, control civilian movement, employ a quick reaction force, conduct a tactical road march, operate an observation post, detain noncombatants, operate with multinational forces, establish a traffic control point, participate with the media, conduct a weapons equipment seizure, inspect a check point react to a person indicted for war crimes, discovery or turn-in and conduct debriefs with Intelligence Officers (S2s). Again, the only MTW METL task present is to Conduct a Tactical Roadmarch.⁶⁷ The above listed tasks are significantly different from tasks listed on MTW METLs. Therefore, it takes considerable time to identify SASO tasks, and then train units to a proficient level. Doctrine does not currently permit units to place SASO tasks on their METL. This guidance may contribute to the irrelevant perception issue of US Army divisions.

Analysis

A review of the US Army division structure proves that both light and heavy units are equipped to conduct MTWs and SASOs. The lack of relevance issue is found in the transition from the MTW METL to the SASO METL. Tasks performed in MTW and SASO are different and require time to train. A solution to the MTW versus SASO METL is the Common METL, which lists both types of tasks on the METL. The final relevant issue analyzed is the effect of peace operations to the division.

The seemingly endless array of world trouble spots, each with its own special problems, keeps military planners busy year round preparing for contingency missions related to peace operations. While many units are actively engaged in preparing for or conducting one of these undertakings, others are incorporating elements of peace operations into all aspects of their training programs, to include combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and home-station field exercises.

LTC Douglas Scalard, "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough, 1996"⁶³

US Army divisions pay an enormous cost when they deploy to SASOs, a mission that currently doctrine does allow units to focus effort on. Soldiers marksmanship skills, as an example, diminish due to lack of adequate ranges and the lack of firing. Heavy units normally deploy without their M1 tanks or M2 Bradley's. This absence from the vehicle causes crew skills to diminish. Heavy units crew stability, the requirement to maintain qualified crews together, is most difficult to maintain. Heavy and Light units both suffer individual weaponry skills when deployed to SASOs because the SASO environment is not equipped with the state of the art ranges built on US Army installations.

Another effect of the increase deployments to SASOs, a trend of the operational environment, is the personnel turbulence. "The most daunting condition was the personnel challenge", according to COL Freakley.⁶⁴ There are differences in peacetime deployability requirements to SASO versus MTW deployability requirements at Ft. Hood. 1st Brigade required the reassignment of over six hundred soldiers to meet the deployable strength. The personnel turbulence is noted not just for SASO but also in MTW as 3d Infantry Division experienced during OPERATION DESERT FOX in 1997. Evidence suggests that once divisions revert to reassigning soldiers, in order to meet the needs of SASO or one MTW, then that division will not meet the personnel requirements if alerted to the other MTW.

The US army current deployments to SASOs degrade unit readiness, which ultimately negatively impacts relevance. For example, an article in CALL The Effect of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness, a peacetime return to readiness for a unit deployed to a SASO is four to six months. Similarly, reconstitution and re-deployment of a unit from a SASO to a MTW takes a minimum two to three months because of the extensive training and reconstitution required of combat arms units. Moreover, there is a quantitative difference for combat arms divisions assigned to peace enforcement missions versus those assigned to peacekeeping missions such as Bosnia. Units alerted for peacekeeping mission average six to twelve months for planning and training. Peace enforcement missions, on the other hand, are considered contingency operations with little advance notice.⁶⁵

The relevance issue will remain until the Army develops a deployable lethal force that is trained prior to alert notification. This force, in order to be relevant, must train a Common METL task list and not

rely on a Mission Rehearsal Exercise to prepare the unit to deploy. The army cannot continue to train strictly on MTW tasks, at the expense of SASO, the most frequent operation.

Chapter IV

Responsiveness

We must refine our training...If we retain this focus, we will be prepared for the 21st century. If we lose our focus, we will not only deny future soldiers the world's finest training, but we stand to achieve only a small fraction of the enormous potential that exists within Army XXI and Army After Next.

LTG Thomas N. Burnett, Jr., "The Second Training Revolution," October 1997⁶⁶

The spectrum of likely future operations describes the need for land forces and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, according to General Eric Shinseki. General Shinseki defines responsiveness as when the army is dominant at every point on the spectrum.⁶⁷ Additionally, for the purposes of this monograph, METL selection and Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) are key components involved in achieving responsiveness. METLs, in the near future, as a result of the Chief's guidance, must be flexible and diverse to encompass the full spectrum from humanitarian assistance to MTW. This chapter answers the question which type of METL; MTW, SASO or combination of MTW and SASO best prepares US Army Divisions for the requirements of the operational environment.

The Chief's means to achieve responsiveness are deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability and sustainability. Deployability is the ability to put a relevant or trained brigade size combat forces anywhere in the world in 96 hours, for any contingency from SASO to MTW, followed by a division in with 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. Agility is the next means articulated by the Chief. Agile is the ability to move units into SASOs and transition smoothly to MTW and back again to a SASO. Agile is similar to present units abilities to move from the offense to the defense and back to the offense. Versatile, on the other hand, is a design in our organizational structure, which will generate formations that can dominate at any point of the spectrum of operations. Lethal, the fourth means to achieve responsiveness, foundation remains the dynamics of combat power, fires, maneuver, leadership and

protection. The Chief's intent is to retain the Light forces deployability while providing it with the lethality and mobility for decisive outcomes. Additionally, heavy forces will retain lethality through overmatch while gaining deployability. Survivability is akin to providing maximum protection for our soldiers and systems while sustainable achieves a reduction in our logistics footprint.⁶⁸

An analysis of General Shinseki's responsiveness and future direction of the US Army indicates that all divisions will in the near future adopt some type of Common METL. A Common METL, is a combination of current MTW tasks and SASO tasks, which best serves the responsive force. A review of a MTW METL (1st Cavalry Division's) shows the following tasks: Mobilize and deploy the force, Conduct RSOI, Conduct Combat Operations (Movement to Contact, Deliberate Attack, Defense), Sustain the Force, Redeploy and Demobilize, and Perform the Missions of an ARFOR. A SASO METL, by contrast, may offer tasks such as: Observation Post Training, Standing Patrol Training, Riot Control Cordon Training, Escort Training, Escort and Safeguarding of Civilian Groups of People, Obstacles and Field Fortifications Training, Land Mine Warfare and Stand-by force training which is general training of personnel designated by the UN.⁶⁹

The requirement to conduct a MRE is no longer valid once divisions change to Common METLs. Currently, FORSCOM headquarters requires maneuver and selected units, mission dependent, to conduct collective theater specific training. Task force collective theater specific training culminates with a MRE. Currently, the MRE is an integrated, multi-echelon, full-resourced training event conducted at the Joint Training Readiness Center (JRTC). This exercise is externally evaluated and results in certified battalions, companies and platoons for Task Force Eagle (Bosnia) SASO. All commanders from platoon level and above are required to participate. The minimum training included in an MRE are: Air-Ground Coordination Exercise, Command Post Exercise, Casualty Evacuation, and a Deployment Exercise. Sites at Forts Drum, Bragg, Polk, Benning and Hood are certified to conduct the Individual Replacement Training (IRT) portion of the MRE. The MRE is no longer valid when METLs become "Common" and units are trained on these tasks routinely.⁷⁰

Analysis

The US Army, in accordance with the NSS, the NMS, and guidance from General Shinseki must adjust the army's training doctrine, and METL selection process. As a result of many factors, the US army is expected to deploy rapidly to full spectrum operations within the current operational environment. The US Army, in order to meet the requirements of the full spectrum operations, must change the MTW focused METLs of heavy CONUS based divisions to a Common METL. US Army CONUS divisions, in order to remain responsive, cannot continue to alert, transition from MTW tasks to SASO tasks, undergo an MRE and then deploy.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this monograph demonstrates that selection of METL tasks should include essential SASO tasks. Additionally, current US Army training doctrine, specifically FM 25-100, is not adequate to prepare units to meet the challenges of both MTW and SASO missions. The US Army cannot continue to train for MTW tasks and once alerted train the SASO tasks, conduct and an MRE and remain relevant to the needs of the NSS and NMS.

The operational environment since 1989 has changed significantly since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union catapulted the US into the role sole remaining super power. Moreover, several nations collapsed as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. These nations collapsed primarily because their structure, authority, legitimate power, law and political order fell apart once the US and the Soviet Union withdrew support. The collapse of these nation states forced the US, the sole remaining super power, to incur more world responsibilities.

The US role as super power required US Army to deploy to Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Hungary, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo since 1990. The current operational environment precipitated changes in the NSS, and the NMS that ultimately changed force structure in the army. Specific threats that the US must respond to are; regional threats, transnational threats, and threats from the spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence collection and failed states. These threats require responses from the US political leadership and the army.

Politically, as a response to the current operational environment, President Clinton signed both PDD 25, which explains command of and operational control of US Troops, and 56 which requires more cooperation throughout governmental agencies, and the military. Operations in the current operational environment are typically intrastate conflicts characterized by extreme political complexity. Success in the current operational environment requires a political and military perspective that is multinational, multiorganizational and multidimensional. The US Army's training doctrine must adapt to the current operational environment in order to remain relevant and responsive to the needs of America and its interest.

US Army capstone training manual, FM 25-100 1988, is outdated. Chapters in this manual, the METL and Battle Focus, continue to serve the army's training very well. FM 25-100, however, was written for the Cold War with the Soviet Union, served the US Army well through an MTW in Iraq, and is still the fundamental training manual for MTW only. Threats, technology, doctrine and the Army's force structure changed significantly since the publication of FM 25-100. For example, FM 100-5, the US Army capstone manual, is on its second revision since the publication of FM 25-100. FM 100-5 1993 edition acknowledges the frequency and criticality of SASOs and dedicates a chapter to SASO with listed principles, unlike the 1988 FM 25-100. FM 100-23, however, does not permit units to list SASO tasks on their METL, despite the frequency of deployment to these operations.

Relevance defined as time of arrival to conflict with a trained force that can be withdrawn to an MTW is difficult to achieve with current doctrine. The current US Army Division system deploys on short notice to an MTW, but deploys slowly to a SASO. This mission deployment paradigm is shifting based on the guidance from the new Chief. The US Army must adjust training doctrine, specifically METL task selection, in order to be dominant against full spectrum operations. This dominance cannot be achieved without changing the MTW only focus on the US Army METLs to Common METLs that will verify both relevance and responsiveness.

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alluded to the CNN effect with instant news and impacts on decisions. Most importantly, as a visionary General Sullivan foresaw the new missions which will require different tools such as a digitized force.

ⁱⁱMAJ Mark Martins, "The Small Change of Soldiering: Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars," Master of Military Art and Science, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1998), 9.

³President William Clinton, A National Security Strategy For A New Century, (NSS) (The White House), October, 1998, 6-7.

^{iv}NSS,7.

^vTerrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, (Brookings Occasional Papers),1.

^{vi}Robert H. Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability," Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Summer 1996, 3.

⁷Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, 89 (Winter 1992-93), 3.

⁸Olson,3.

⁹Robert H. Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability," Parameters, Summer 1996, 3. Also sited in Lyons and Ahmater that the "strategic threat of chaos occurs when states collapse and the real international interests are at stake.

¹⁰NMS,5.

¹¹Ibid, 5.

¹²Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, force Without War: U.S. Armed forces as a Political Instrument, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978, 16. Blechman and Kaplan states that " a political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national

authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence." Additionally, Chapter II categorizes the US use of armed forces for political objectives as international confrontations; sometimes-minor disturbances in international relations; and other times where there is no conflict. Blechman Kaplan cautions on page 17 that the political use of military power in discrete instances may lead to unwanted dependency on the US and hostility, but of other nations in the affected region.

¹³Richard Newman, "Can Peacekeepers make War?", US News and World Report, January 1998, 2.

¹⁴Ibid,

¹⁵Dennis J. Reimer, "Challenge and Change: A legacy for the Future," Military Review, Vol.LXXVII,4 July-August 1997,110.

¹⁶Max G. Manwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia, "Parameters," Winter 1998,2.

¹⁷Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Vol.24, No.3, Spring 1998, 362-367.

¹⁸LTC J. Michael Hardesty, "Training for Peace: the US Army's Post-Cold War Strategy", US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. LTC Hardesty analyzes the evolution of the employment of military force since the Weinberger Doctrine through both PDD-25 and PDD –56. Most importantly, he questions that because SASO is so different from war itself then should our training strategy change to enhance efficiency.

¹⁹Manwarring, 3.

²⁰Jennifer Taw, David Persselin, Maren Leed, "Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness," RAND 1988, 57-62.

²¹Ibid, 23.

²²Ibid, 20.

²³Manwarring, 7.

²⁴Media Relations Division, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/new/Oct1999/r19991026sfor.html>.

²⁵DefenseLINK, American forces Information Service news Articles, "Optempo, Perstempo: What they Mean," August 1999, 1.

²⁶Richard M. Swain, Donald I. Gilmore and Carolyn D. Conway, eds., selected Papers of General William E. Depuy, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1994) 183.

²⁷Field Manual 101-5-1 MCRP 5-2A, OPERATIONAL TERMS AND GRAPHICS, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Marine corps 1997), 1-55.

²⁸NMS, 10.

²⁹Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, 57.

³⁰NMS, 10.

³¹Field Manual 100-5, OPERATONS, (Headquarters Department of the Army 1993), 2-0.

³²Ibid, 2-0.

³³Ibid, 13-0.

³⁴Ibid, 13-3 through 13-4.

³⁵Richard J. Rinaldo, "Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW" , Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, 114-116.

³⁶Field Manual 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS, (Headquarters Department of the Army 1994), vi.

³⁷TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, FORCE XXI OPERATIONS, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 1994) 4-1 through 4-2.

³⁸Field Manual 25-100, TRAINING THE FORCE, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1988), 1-1.

³⁹Ibid, 1-3 through 1-7.

⁴⁰Ibid, 2-1 through 2-3.

⁴¹LTC Michael D. Jones, LTC Mark E. O'Neill and LTC Curtis M. Scaparotti, "Training Americas Army For the Next Millennium", (U.S. Army War College 1998), 35-36.

⁴²Ibid, 36.

⁴³Field Manual 25-101, BATTLE FOCUS TRAINING, (Headquarters, Department of the Army), 1-10.

⁴⁴Field Manual 25-100, 2-1 through 2-3.

⁴⁵Field Manual 100-23, 87.

⁴⁶Dr. Hugo E. Mayer, Operations Other Than War, (TRADOC Analysis Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS 1995) 5-2.

⁴⁷Colonel Steven P. Schook, "Paying the Price for Versatility," Military Review, (September/October 1997), 1-8.

⁴⁸U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) for the Behavior and Social Sciences, Training Requirements for Stability Operations, 2. Article sited September 3, 1999 at <http://www.ari.army.mil/ootw.htm> .

⁴⁹Ibid, 4.

⁵⁰Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company, ARTEP 7-10-MTP, (Headquarters Department of the Army), 1994, 3-1.

⁵¹The Field Manual 100-5 (2000) summer 1999 writing team led by LTC Rotkof.

⁵²The First Cavalry Division Mission Statement, <http://www.hoo-pao.army.mil/1stcadiv/msn/htm>, August, 1999, 1.

⁵³The Army Chief of Staff Homepage, General Eric Shinseki, The Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation, (October 15, 1999), <http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/991012.htm>.

⁵⁴Gerry J. Gilmore, "Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki," ArmyLINK NEWS, (Army News Service, October 13, 1999) 2.

⁵⁵Field Manual 71-100, DIVISION OPERATIONS, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1996), 1-4 through 1-5.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷Nonattribution. A 1st cavalry Division Staff Officer, August 1999, provided the 1st Cavalry Division METL. The 1st Cavalry Division did not change their METL prior to, during or after the Bosnia mission. The 1st Cavalry, however, dramatically changed their training strategy, which indicates that they trained a SASO METL.

⁵⁸Colonel Benjamin C. Freakley, LTC Kevin C.M. Benson, LTC Frederick Rudesheim and Major Brian J. Butcher, "Training for Peace Support Operations,: Military Revue, August 1998, 1-2.

⁵⁹Ibid, 1.

⁶⁰Ibid, Figure 1.

⁶¹Ibid, Figure 1.

⁶³LTC Douglas Scalard, "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough", Military Review, 1.

⁶⁴Freakley, 7.

⁶⁵CALL, "The Effect of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," <http://call.army.mil/call/spc/sdy/unitrdy/peaceops.htm>, 3.

⁶⁶LTG Thomas N. Burnett Jr., "The Second Training Revolution," Army, October 1997, 116.

⁶⁷General Shinseki, 2.

⁶⁸Ibid, 2.

⁶⁹Dennis J. Quinn, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, (National Defense University Press, 1994), 67-68.

⁷⁰Annex, T (Training), "FORSCOM SFOR SUPPORT PLAN TO OPERATION JOINT FORGE, concept of the operation, <http://freddie.forscom.army.mil/plans/sfor/baseplan.doc>, September 1999, 1-3.